Had some more time to reflect and go through the math - these options still change the outcome of the prior vote:
What was proposed and passed through snapshot was:
Option A: Use 17.5% monthly treasury fee income to buy back PERP over the years to cover all op4>op2 users, for their op4-op2 amount.($3.59M), pro rata to compensation amount.
So option 4 from your proposal, which gives 0 income to the DAO yet still pays out 8.75% to V1 users (at an implied rate of 50% income to the DAO doesn’t make sense and breaches the previous vote).
Same goes for option 3, which also implies 50% income to DAO based on V1 payout % (whilst in reality paying the DAO 25%)
The previous proposal also doesn’t mention how much implied fee revenue is going towards the DAO - so hard-setting these parameters to 50% of DAO income doesn’t really make sense and is kind of taking advantage of the governance process.
I’m 100% for not snubbing v1 users out of the previous vote, but I also highly advise against setting DAO income to 0% as this will be a lose/lose for the DAO and V1 users.
As such, my recommended adjusted parameters to put forward for the vote would be:
* 25% vePERP / 75% DAO
* 50% vePERP / 50% DAO
* 75% vePERP / 25% DAO
* 90% vePERP / 10% DAO
In each case, it is implied that 17.5% of DAO income will go towards the V1 buyback plan as per this proposal.
The benefits of these options are:
- We aren’t altering the outcome of a previous vote by setting DAO income to 0%
- V1 users are not being snubbed and will still receive 17.5% of DAO income in all outcomes, satisfying the previous V1 buyback proposal
- We make vePERP flywheel speculators happy, as the 90% fee revenue option is present
- It remains in-line with the original proposal options laid out by CMS and the team (but also includes 90/10).
Let me know thoughts, but imo these voting options provide the best outcome for vePERP stakers, the DAO and v1 users.