I like this one the best:
Looks the cleanest and easiest to understand for me, and not infringing on the previous v1 buyback plan. Let’s hurry up and put to vote to boost our vePERP yield!
5 Likes
I like this one the most too, it’s clear and acceptable for both users and the protocol. No matter the DAO needs income or not, we should keep our promise to users in the first place.
4 Likes
I wasnt going to wade in here but then I’m seeing people make some pretty strange commentary so here’s my 2 gwei.
One person’s strong opinion doesn’t represent the opinion from the whole community. I strongly disagree to include the option that directly contradicts the previous vote.
If its one guy’s opinion then just let that opinion die on the ballot. If you oppose the simple idea from appearing on the ballot at all, this gives a very strange taste - like its straight up censorship. A pretty bad look imo.
Stop screwing the v1 users to bring back the dark history of Perp
Hey why not let’s shine a light on that dark history 
- March 2021 - public discussion of v1 problems starts (funds can be extracted via funding payments)
- May 2021 - work on v2 starts
- Nov 2021 - v2 launches & support for v1 ends (UI warnings etc. posted some time after)
- May 2022 market tanks and v1 can’t hold up & gets shutdown
- Gov vote is held to decide fate of funds
- Vote result: small accounts get first dibs
- Top 1% of accounts take a hit
- Alameda is the biggest of the 1%, which maybe says something
- Some of these top 1% start claiming they are not degens, instead they were
gamblinginvesting friends & family money, and that Perp’s reputation will be obliterated if thesedegensuser’s funds aren’t bailed out by token hodlers …
</dark history>
To wrap up
Let the holders speak - include all the options and let the best one win. If you are fighting to keep options off the ballot, thats some sketchy sh*t my defi fren, and imo really not a good look.
3 Likes
Alameda is the one that that benefited the most from option 2, a whopping 2.5M that should’ve belonged to the low leverage users. The issue was debated to full length in many previous posts over a time frame of many months. Users who are curious about it can check out the Buyback plan post that fully covers all the details mentioned here. The voters previously decided that they are FOR the proposal. It’s disgusting you’re not willing to accept the previous vote result and try to use this opportunity to revert it!
You gravely underestimated the number of users who were affected by this, many are groups of friends and family who combined to a single accounts. The same goes to you, all of you who were against v1 Buyback are probably from the same group who has an agenda to slam down the Buyback plan, even going so far to revert a previously passed vote! No normal users/investors would not sympathize with other affected users. It’s becoming more and more apparent you’re part of a faction within the team, because who else would fought so hard on this?
If you’re really from the team, it will be a real shame for Perp, you’re trying to temporarily passed the Buyback plan to make the v1 users calm down, then when the chance arrives you try to revert it by some loop holes of another vote. Everything is under your control. If that’s the case, you are deserved to be exposed to as many social media channels as possible. That’s the purpose of news media, to let people know the ugly truth so that things can move on for the better.
That’s what the customers of any kind of business has. Customer paid for service but didn’t get any, of course they will spread to other people how bad this business is. Similarly, users who put money into the PERP platform and suddenly lose all their money, do you really expect they will be sitting quiet about it? To call users “holding reputations hostage”, why don’t you start to improve yourself first so that customer will start saying good thing about you!? To pass the Buyback was a good step towards that, but having this discussion really set back all of the previous effort that was built up to recover Perp’s reputation.
It’s Hana’s proposal, so it’s up to her to put whatever options she wants. If she really put the options that contradicts the Buyback plans that passed, it falls on her. It will be reputation damage on her and the team, it’s up to them to decide. If you have a hidden agenda to slam down the v1 Buyback, do another proposal!(and we will fight our heart out there!) Don’t mix it up with this vote that’s supposed be a good news for PERP. Don’t use this as an opportunity to fulfill your hidden agenda, it’s not fair to the rest of the Perp holders!
2 Likes
Actually - had time to go back and read through this past proposals.
On second thought, you’re right about it not making much sense to reverse the decision on the previous proposal. Adding too many options would also further complicate the end-decision.
I guess your recommended options make the most sense.
forget the other stuff
4 Likes
Had some more time to reflect and go through the math - these options still change the outcome of the prior vote:
What was proposed and passed through snapshot was:
Option A: Use 17.5% monthly treasury fee income to buy back PERP over the years to cover all op4>op2 users, for their op4-op2 amount.($3.59M), pro rata to compensation amount.
So option 4 from your proposal, which gives 0 income to the DAO yet still pays out 8.75% to V1 users (at an implied rate of 50% income to the DAO doesn’t make sense and breaches the previous vote).
Same goes for option 3, which also implies 50% income to DAO based on V1 payout % (whilst in reality paying the DAO 25%)
The previous proposal also doesn’t mention how much implied fee revenue is going towards the DAO - so hard-setting these parameters to 50% of DAO income doesn’t really make sense and is kind of taking advantage of the governance process.
I’m 100% for not snubbing v1 users out of the previous vote, but I also highly advise against setting DAO income to 0% as this will be a lose/lose for the DAO and V1 users.
As such, my recommended adjusted parameters to put forward for the vote would be:
* 25% vePERP / 75% DAO
* 50% vePERP / 50% DAO
* 75% vePERP / 25% DAO
* 90% vePERP / 10% DAO
In each case, it is implied that 17.5% of DAO income will go towards the V1 buyback plan as per this proposal.
The benefits of these options are:
- We aren’t altering the outcome of a previous vote by setting DAO income to 0%
- V1 users are not being snubbed and will still receive 17.5% of DAO income in all outcomes, satisfying the previous V1 buyback proposal
- We make vePERP flywheel speculators happy, as the 90% fee revenue option is present
- It remains in-line with the original proposal options laid out by CMS and the team (but also includes 90/10).
Let me know thoughts, but imo these voting options provide the best outcome for vePERP stakers, the DAO and v1 users.
1 Like
How hypocritical, if you really 100% for not snubbing the v1 users as you proclaimed, you would’ve advocated for 8.75%. That’s the calculus we have been using to estimate the time we needed to get paid out, which is around 11 years in the best case scenario assuming OI is always overflowing! Having 8.75% would be in line with the spirit of the previous vote.
There is no fundamental difference in your proposal than 100% vePERP / 0% DAO to screw v1 Buyback. Instead of trying to find a solution to rectify these two proposals, you keep using the loop hole to slam v1. I’m truly disappointed that the team is doing everything possible to try to minimize the v1 payout. Are you guys in such a severe financial trouble to even need to squeeze out the tiny percentage from v1? I wonder how this will be perceived by the rest of the crypto community. Any options that resulted in less than 8.75% will be flying against the spirit of the Buyback proposal that was passed.
If you are really just fighting for DAO, then let’s do this instead:
- 8.75% Buyback, rest 25/75 vePERP/DAO
- 8.75% Buyback, rest 50/50 vePERP/DAO
- 8.75% Buyback, rest 75/25 vePERP/DAO
- 8.75% Buyback, rest 90/10 vePERP DAO
1 Like
If you can link me where exactly in this proposal it’s mentioned that the v1 payout percentage will be hard-set at 50% of DAO income, then I will happily change my stance - but what you are suggesting is altering the previous governance proposal by hard setting these parameters - which goes against the entire point of governance. As Abdulla mentioned earlier - this would make a mockery of the entire governance process.
The previous proposal outlines 17.5% of DAO treasury income - no more, no less.
(Also not everyone that disagrees with you is on the team, lol.)
For options 1-4:
Respectively, this translates to 13.125%, 8.75%, 4.313% and 1.725% for the V1 users - the only option which would be debatable is option 4 (90/10), as this was not present in the original fee distribution proposal by CMS - and translates to a much lower payout % for v1 buybacks.
I think a middle-ground for v1 buybacks could be warranted for option 4, as this is the only parameter which has changed from the original fee distribution proposal. This could be modified specifically for v1 buybacks, or removed as an option completely, depending on which has more demand.
1 Like
Here you go, here’s the very original post that the proposal have referenced to
This include the expected time of payout of 11 years, which is already a Super long time, and that was really our bottom line.
Now you’re effectively making it 22 years or even 55 years!? We’ll probably be all be dead by that point!
Taking % off from DAO treasury was suggested by LeeKB from the team. If it’s being used as a gimmick to only temporarily calm down v1 users, then shame on you Perp! That’s the way you treat your users and customers!?
Says someone who’s from the team!
If your opinion is representative of the entire Perp team, then it’s really a shame on PERP. You only voted the Buyback pass just to calm down the v1 users, in reality there’s no sincerity at all from your side. It’s all fake and under your control. For a moment I thought you guys finally turned around for the better after you passed the v1 Buyback and now you try to do everything possible to revert the Buyback plan!?
It’s now obvious the whole purpose of this vote is NOT about vePERP any more, but about fulfilling the team’s hidden agenda to screw the v1 users. V2 users and prospective investors, now you can see through the true nature of the type of people you put your hard earned money to.
Back during v1 shutdown, Perp took our money to compensate their own investor outside of VAMM rule, to this day they still haven’t compensated us. They voted for the Buyback plan to temporarily make v1 calm down, but later they used a loop hole in the previous proposal to try to nullify/delay/minimize the payout to the v1 users, prolonging the payout time from the already long 11 years to 55 years and even infinite years!! This project is a dead end, because the leadership is so dishonest. The team is a mob full of liars. It’s really a shame to Taiwan and the whole Defi community. Truly disappointed.
1 Like
I completely agree. 100% should be kept at least for some time to create positive loop back.
1 Like
Solace is a highly valued community member, but he is not part of the core team. The core team has not taken any side in this debate, and has no intention of doing so.
Please provide evidence for this statement.
Please provide evidence for this statement.
1 Like
LeeKB, do you really want to open up the old wound here in this forum?
The top five accounts that should have been liquidated under normal vAMM benefited from option 2 and got 2.5M back that should’ve belonged to our low leverage users, resulting in a near complete loss of fund to those users. This has been fully debated in previous discussion and I won’t repeat here.
The new evidence is, based on on-chain data, on Jul 12th, the top five accounts all withdrew their compensated money total of ~$2.5M all at the same time! Indicating they belong to the same entity.
They subsequently send the money immediately to other wallet addresses,
and one of them (0x83a127952d266a6ea306c40ac62a4a70668fe3bd) has now being confirmed to be Alameda Research.
and Alameda was Perp’s investor!
Even Stratoperp said the top account is Alameda
Other users can feel free to check the on-chain data of optimism and ether mainnet for yourself. It’s a real shame that the you are constantly toying with the v1 users and not stepping up to your responsibility! That $2.5M was supposed to be our money because Alameda was liquidated under op4 (vAMM), we signed up for vAMM rule when we put money on your platform, not some random subjective centralized vote option that the team drafted to please their own investor!
Solace is tightly connected to the team, he’s like a spokesperson of the team. It’s hard to imagine he would say things publicly on such important issue without consulting with the core team. If Hana really took Solace’s advice and put options that prolonged the v1 payout by taking DAO to 0% or 10% (55~ infinite years to pay out), then that would be the double evidence for that.
2 Likes
Omg, looks like this is out of control, for something that’s so simple, why do Solace and the other members are so against the v1 users? The Buyback plan has passed, keep them happy and move on to make the vePERP holders happy next.
In my opinion, this is actually still consistent with the previous v1 vote, because it’s a simplified version of RDL’s original idea:
This is perfectly fine with me, consistent with the previous vote, and give vePERP a big yield boost! Then some people who seem to wage a campaign against the v1 users are starting to complain this is too complicated and not simple enough, and when v1 users did make it simple, they complain it’s not consistent with the previous vote. So it’s clear there’s no easy way to convince those people to buy in.
In my opinion, we shouldn’t waste any more time, and strike for a percentage that everyone is happy.
If the issue is DAO doesn’t receive anything, we can do:
-
50% DAO / 50% vePERP holders
-
50% DAO / 50% vePERP holders, then allocate 50% of DAO income to vePERP.
(Effectively 75% vePERP /16.25% DAO /8.75% vBuyback) -
50% DAO / 50% vePERP holders, then allocate 62.5% of DAO income to vePERP.
(Effectively 81.25% vePERP/ 10% DAO /8.75% Buyback ) -
50% DAO/ 50% vePERP holders, then allocate 72.5% of DAO income to vePERP.
(Effectively 86.25% vePERP/ 5% DAO /8.75 % Buyback)
This way, vePERP got a big boost in yield, DAO people are happy, and v1 users are happy. Win-win-win?
3 Likes
@Solace , actually these did NOT violate the previous Buyback vote , because they are the simplified version of the following:
If you don’t want the simplified version, let’s go back to the original then. This is consistent with the previous Bubyack vote result. “too complicated” is not an excuse, are you so illiterate that you can’t even understand two sentences?
4 Likes
oh yea, I almost forgot about the original vote options. I strongly support this, this way it won’t violate any previous governance post in writing or in spirit.
3 Likes
Stay respectful.
@RDL My views represent no one else’s but my own.
I’ll go through this once more, as it appears both @RDL and @rundontwalk chose to reply before reading my post properly.
The original fee distribution parameters, when you created the V1 buyback vote were:
1) 25% vePERP / 75% DAO
2) 50% vePERP / 50% DAO
3) 75% vePERP / 25% DAO
The only option not present was option 4:
4) 90% vePERP / 10% DAO
As such, you would’ve seen that I also wrote:
I’m not advocating for option 4 unless a modification is made so that the V1 buyback % is higher, as it was not present in the original options.
@RDL, you had proposed 17.5% of treasury income for options 1-3, which had passed through a formal governance vote. Backpedaling and trying to manipulate this vote to obtain double the treasury income (effectively 35% of treasury income) for option 3 (75/25) is not okay. Regardless, am willing to compromise.
I can see reasoning for a higher % of treasury income for option 4 because this was not present in the original fee distr. parameters when you had conducted the V1 buyback proposal. Option 1-3 should stay as they are. Would you be willing to propose a % of treasury income for 90/10?
To summarise, this is what the votes would look like with your suggestions:
1) 25% vePERP / 75% DAO
2) 50% vePERP / 50% DAO
3) 75% vePERP / 25% DAO
4) 75% vePERP / 25% DAO (with 35% of treasury income going to V1 buybacks)
5) 90% vePERP / 10% DAO (with 35% of treasury income going to V1 buybacks)
IMO, addition of the new option 4 complicates things (and the buybacks really shouldn’t be the main point of this proposal), but nonetheless, if you think this is the fairest way forward, I would be willing to agree on this.
Respectively, this translates to 13.125%, 8.75%, 4.313%, 8.75% and 3.45% for v1 buybacks.
1 Like
Look I don’t want to be rude towards v1 affected guys but I don’t think they have a leverage in pushing their option.
I was active v1 user as well, close to the end it was clear that something bad will happen and those who was reaping insurance fund won’t be able to withdraw in full - it was pure game either you’re leaving first or staying longer to earn more funding (which was extremely high) and risking not being able to leave. Obviously these remaining v1 guys either didn’t understand risks and/or were very greedy making double digits % in funding.
All in all I don’t blame them, but putting the whole protocol at risk of survival just to make sure they are paid from the very beginning is not right, I think it will be better for all parties if 100% is distributed to vePerp, token price restores and then after 6 months v1 users start being paid off.
1 Like
This is totally unfounded. The purpose of the treasury income is to be used in growth. Allocating additional DAO fund to fund a marketing project of increasing vePERP yield is the central point of this proposal. I don’t see anything wrong for anyone (except the people who wants to slam v1) with leaving it at 50/50, then allocate whatever addition % of DAO income to fund additional vePERP yield. After all, the un-utilized fund in DAO was the central thesis of this proposal.
Exactly! I’m amazed all these anti-v1 users here holding grudges on the previous vote and trying to take advantage of this opportunity to minimize v1 payout. Allocating additional fund from the DAO (aka growth fund) to vePERP sounds perfectly okay to the general holders. VePERP holders would actually feel better if these funds are coming from the team/DAO rather than coming from the v1 users resulting in them waiting an extra 10 years (on top of the long 10 years) to receive all of their compensation!
I would cut out 3 and 5, but even then I don’t like the general format in your proposal, as if v1 users are receiving special treatment in addition from the previous vote.
I strongly advocate keeping it at 50/50, and having DAO allocate additional fund to support vePERP, this could be temporary or could be for a while, it’s up to the DAO to decide and adjust the % of their fund to allocate to fund this campaign to kick off the positive feed back loop, which is what this vote is all about,
From outside investors’ perspective, DAO still receives a healthy 50% number to fund various different projects for the growth of the protocol (growing the protocol by giving more yield to vePERP being one) From vePERP holders’ perspective, they receive 50% + additional 25~40% bonus coming from DAO for 6+months or 1 year, that’s also good news for them!
There’re easy ways to make this harmonious and good news for all parties involved. Leave v1 users out of this, keep them happy by sticking to its original expected ~10 years payout period, which was really the bottom line, we were in earnest when we proposed the initial payout schedule, I even voted for 17.5% instead of 25% in the Buyback plan myself, because I was sensitive to the need of the protocol to have sufficient fund in the DAO. We really were just asking the minimum. In turn, we now receive a barrage of insensitive comments in this forum by people who have hidden agenda to screw v1 users, to this day, they still deny responsibility and think that v1 users are at fault, this has been debated many time overs in the past already, we are at fault of the slippage up to the moment the exchange was shutdown, but we are not at fault for the complete loss of fund after the shutdown because the team was fully in control of the situation after that point.
8.75% of overflown fee income will result in the life and death of protocol!? You have been arguing against v1 from the beginning of time, so it’s understandable you will say that.
1 Like
Yes, at the moment when PERP is struggling to survive, during bear market all efforts should be first applied to steps with direct effect on perp price, the revenue stream actually is so small now, that even 8.75% matters.
Just to make sure I also don’t believe any DAO investments (apart from v1 rescue funding ) could be more effective than plain distribution to vePerp. This is all irrelevant, GMX is flourishing because of good return on their token.
1 Like
Your logic is so wrong, the revenue stream is small, so 8.75% of that small revenue would even be smaller, thus it has minimal impact on the survival of the protocol.
How do you know that? Just based on the DUNE analytics? Are you from the team? Do you know the internal finance of the team?
From what I gathered, Perp is now working with Binance who just raised $2B industry rescue fund. If Perp is really struggling as you suggested, I wonder if they’d include or continue to include Perp as one of the projects to be rescued knowing the way it’s treating its users!
Customers are the core of any business. I’d be seriously concerned about Perp if all of the anti-v1 users comments here are coming from the team. Actually, screwing the v1 users might significantly increase the chance of the protocol’s collapsing due to the reputation damage more so than it helps with having a 1% difference in yield to attempt to attract new investors.
1 Like