Stay respectful.
@RDL My views represent no one else’s but my own.
I’ll go through this once more, as it appears both @RDL and @rundontwalk chose to reply before reading my post properly.
The original fee distribution parameters, when you created the V1 buyback vote were:
1) 25% vePERP / 75% DAO
2) 50% vePERP / 50% DAO
3) 75% vePERP / 25% DAO
The only option not present was option 4:
4) 90% vePERP / 10% DAO
As such, you would’ve seen that I also wrote:
I’m not advocating for option 4 unless a modification is made so that the V1 buyback % is higher, as it was not present in the original options.
@RDL, you had proposed 17.5% of treasury income for options 1-3, which had passed through a formal governance vote. Backpedaling and trying to manipulate this vote to obtain double the treasury income (effectively 35% of treasury income) for option 3 (75/25) is not okay. Regardless, am willing to compromise.
I can see reasoning for a higher % of treasury income for option 4 because this was not present in the original fee distr. parameters when you had conducted the V1 buyback proposal. Option 1-3 should stay as they are. Would you be willing to propose a % of treasury income for 90/10?
To summarise, this is what the votes would look like with your suggestions:
1) 25% vePERP / 75% DAO
2) 50% vePERP / 50% DAO
3) 75% vePERP / 25% DAO
4) 75% vePERP / 25% DAO (with 35% of treasury income going to V1 buybacks)
5) 90% vePERP / 10% DAO (with 35% of treasury income going to V1 buybacks)
IMO, addition of the new option 4 complicates things (and the buybacks really shouldn’t be the main point of this proposal), but nonetheless, if you think this is the fairest way forward, I would be willing to agree on this.
Respectively, this translates to 13.125%, 8.75%, 4.313%, 8.75% and 3.45% for v1 buybacks.