This part I don’t understand.
When PERP holders voted on the V1 buyback proposal, they didn’t vote for an estimated payout period - they voted for 17.5% of DAO treasury income to be used to buyback PERP for v1 users – any estimations made on payout length are simply a guestimate as to how long it’ll take. Option 3 was always a possibility from the original fee parameters, so I’m unsure you never factored that in.
Mechanically, based on how fee distribution works, prolonging a decade, or two decades, is something that you also agreed to with the proposal. Even if V1 receives the highest % allocated to v1 buybacks (13.25%) - if for whatever reason the IF doesn’t reach its threshold, no funds will be used to buyback PERP. Also include the fact that fee distr. is a product of volume and it also means you are highly dependent on volume sustaining for 11 years, constantly.
It’s a bleak statement, but I’m trying to poke holes in the foundation of your argument so you can see what you are actually arguing for.
To follow up - my recommendations remain the same as CMS’s originally proposed fee parameters:
- 25% vePERP / 75% DAO
- 50% vePERP / 50% DAO
- 75% vePERP / 25% DAO
4) 90% vePERP / 10% DAO (with double the treasury income going to V1 buybacks)
Strike option 4 as I only included it if there was enough demand for it, which I don’t think there is. I would also agree to a higher buyback % to option 3 in subsequent votes - as we’ve discussed V1 isn’t the focus of this vote. Getting a fee distribution ratio, regardless of what it is, should be our main priority with this proposal - anything else can be sorted out in subsequent governance discussion.