Proposal: Fee Distribution Parameter Vote Relaunch - Fee Split

[Ryan]

@hanamizuki

But I still think it’s a bit subjective as people do think about adding a time factor. So if the community still wants the option I’d keep it.

Please leave option 4. There are supporters of this option. Only a small number of v1 affected users are against it. Let’s see how people vote.

[RDL]

@hanamizuki

Unless we rewrite everything, the team will need to manually calculate and send the tokens from DAO to vePERP holders every week,

As I mentioned previously, the team doesn’t have to rewrite, they can just use the final ratio and treat it as the result of a two-step process.

[RDL]

@Ryan

Only a small number of v1 affected users are against it.

Not true at all, see below:

@abdulla

And I strongly oppose to having the “100%vePERP / 0% DAO” option.

@Innerpeace

0% wouldn’t make sense

@axer

No matter the DAO needs income or not, we should keep our promise to users in the first place.

@David9825

Perp should really turn a new page by not screwing the v1 users again

@jackm

I would prefer more fee goes to vePERP but at the same time not hurting v1 users,

@hanamizuki You should listen to the voices of your real users/investors.

[hanamizuki]

@RDL

if vePERP holders want higher yield, they would want to vote for the 50-50 option which then lead to vote #2 that allows them to earn higher yield up to 86.25% or even 91.25% (if we include that option in vote#2) of overflown fee.

Even if you believe they would want to vote for 50-50, I still don’t see a reason to remove it from the options. It’s one of the original options.

@RDL

As I mentioned previously, the team doesn’t have to rewrite, they can just use the final ratio and treat it as the result of a two-step process.

Afaik even if we only take the final ratio, there’s still a new parameter “buyback” that’s not in the tokenomics plan. The buyback plan is about the DAO treasury fee income.

@Ryan

Please leave option 4. There are supporters of this option. Only a small number of v1 affected users are against it. Let’s see how people vote.

Thanks. What’s your thought on the v1 issue then? If we have 100% in the option, some ppl think it doesn’t make sense (not just v1 users) as we have passed a vote to pay v1 users from “DAO treasury fee income”.

@RDL

@hanamizuki You should listen to the voices of your real users/investors.

Thanks for the reminder. I’m doing my best here…

[tzt]

How about this?

1. 50% DAO / 50% vePERP holders
2. 75% DAO / 25% vePERP holders
3. 25% DAO / 75% vePERP holders, update v1 Buyback plan from 17.5% to 35% of the DAO fee income.

This way the v1 users are still in the same expected timeline for the payout. I believe someone might have already proposed this before.
The vote option is still about DAO% vs. vePERP%, so it’s still within the scope.

[tzt]

okay found the original poster to be Solace:

@Solace

To summarise, this is what the votes would look like with your suggestions:

1) 25% vePERP / 75% DAO
2) 50% vePERP / 50% DAO
3) 75% vePERP / 25% DAO
4) 75% vePERP / 25% DAO (with 35% of treasury income going to V1 buybacks)
5) 90% vePERP / 10% DAO (with 35% of treasury income going to V1 buybacks)

IMO, addition of the new option 4 complicates things (and the buybacks really shouldn’t be the main point of this proposal), but nonetheless, if you think this is the fairest way forward, I would be willing to agree on this.

I would either remove 5) or making it 87.5% of the treasury income going to v1 Buybacks:
I would remove 3) as well to keep 4) only

So:

1. 25% vePERP / 75% DAO
2. 50% vePERP / 50% DAO
3. 75% vePERP / 25% DAO (with 35% of treasury income going to V1 buybacks)
4. 90% vePERP / 10% DAO (with 87.5% of treasury income going to V1 buybacks)

to be consistent with the spirit of the Buyback plan and not prolong the payment term.

[Solace]

@RDL

Additionally, option 3 prolonged the v1 payout

This part I don’t understand.

When PERP holders voted on the V1 buyback proposal, they didn’t vote for an estimated payout period - they voted for 17.5% of DAO treasury income to be used to buyback PERP for v1 users – any estimations made on payout length are simply a guestimate as to how long it’ll take. Option 3 was always a possibility from the original fee parameters, so I’m unsure you never factored that in.

Mechanically, based on how fee distribution works, prolonging a decade, or two decades, is something that you also agreed to with the proposal. Even if V1 receives the highest % allocated to v1 buybacks (13.25%) - if for whatever reason the IF doesn’t reach its threshold, no funds will be used to buyback PERP. Also include the fact that fee distr. is a product of volume and it also means you are highly dependent on volume sustaining for 11 years, constantly.

It’s a bleak statement, but I’m trying to poke holes in the foundation of your argument so you can see what you are actually arguing for.

To follow up - my recommendations remain the same as CMS’s originally proposed fee parameters:

1. 25% vePERP / 75% DAO
2. 50% vePERP / 50% DAO
3. 75% vePERP / 25% DAO
   4) 90% vePERP / 10% DAO (with double the treasury income going to V1 buybacks)

Strike option 4 as I only included it if there was enough demand for it, which I don’t think there is. I would also agree to a higher buyback % to option 3 in subsequent votes - as we’ve discussed V1 isn’t the focus of this vote. Getting a fee distribution ratio, regardless of what it is, should be our main priority with this proposal - anything else can be sorted out in subsequent governance discussion.

[tipsy]

I’d personally like to add another option with even more to vePERP (e.g. number 4), without any adjustment to the buyback % - any adjustment should need another vote imo.

But I think this is the most clear and concise options given, so I’m ok with this if it will stop all the disputes with v1 users.

I’m not in support for any options trying to tell the DAO how to use their funds - I think that should be it’s own vote.

Forgot to reply, but this is in response to @Solace

[RDL]

@Solace

Option 3 was always a possibility from the original fee parameters,

At the time, there’s no requirement of the vote having to pass quorum. We thought the 50-50 was passed already otherwise where’s the current vePERP reward come from? The v1 compensation-related votes were the first ones ever that required quorum passage. You can see how difficult it was to achieve the victory we had.

Also, the treasury income idea came from the team, specifically LeeKB, we were just some v1 users unfamiliar with the company’s structure. Of course we will take whatever the team suggested at the time.

To me this is just a big orchestration by the team. They said the vote option is out of scope, then it’s out of scope. They said an option is technically infeasible then it’s infeasible, except they only tell you the last minuet!? Despite so many people have already expressed concerns about impacting the v1 users, they carry on with their own agenda. Truely disappointed of the team. The v1 Buyback was passed. People are not stupid to not see through that you’re now trying to negate it by doing EVERYTHING possible. Instead of helping v1 users, you try to minimize them!

[RDL]

@Solace

Mechanically, based on how fee distribution works, prolonging a decade, or two decades, is something that you also agreed to with the proposal. Even if V1 receives the highest % allocated to v1 buybacks (13.25%) - if for whatever reason the IF doesn’t reach its threshold, no funds will be used to buyback PERP. Also include the fact that fee distr. is a product of volume and it also means you are highly dependent on volume sustaining for 11 years, constantly.

We understand that factors that the protocol cannot control such as the insurance overflow, users volume…etc will affect the payout time. However, to purposely manipulate the % DAO income to make it 0 so we don’t get paid anything is a straight up gimmick and beyond disgusting. It brought back all the unpleasant memory and reminded me how shady this team was in v1 sunset. They hide their agenda behind vote options that pleases the masses but completely screw over a certain group. This time is the same. I don’t sense ANY sincere effort from the team in trying to help out v1 users.

[tzt]

@RDL

except they only tell you the last minuet!?

yea this is bad, the team should’ve brought it early about feasibility and scope. Doing it last minute is very questionable.

[Solace]

@RDL

At the time, there’s no requirement of the vote having to pass quorum. We thought the 50-50 was passed already

This part is understandable. Also wasn’t fully aware either.

But now that I’m up-to-speed - would you be happy to receive the extra buyback % from option 1 (25% vePERP / 75% DAO) if it meant partaking the downside with option 3 (75% vePERP / 25% DAO)? Isn’t the whole point of voting for a % of DAO income the fact that you’re exposed to whatever % allocation the treasury is receiving?

EDIT:

@RDL

the % DAO income to make it 0 so we don’t get paid anything

also want to clarify- this is no longer a vote option afaik

[tzt]

If the team really do care about v1 users, they should go with Solace’s

1. 25% vePERP / 75% DAO
2. 50% vePERP / 50% DAO
3. 75% vePERP / 25% DAO, 35% DAO income to v1 Buyback.

which he already expressed support previously.

[RDL]

@Solace

Isn’t the whole point of voting for a % of DAO income the fact that you’re exposed to whatever % allocation the treasury is receiving?

Not if the team is malicious enough to make it 0%! Which is now more and more evident that was what they initially had hoped for. If we didn’t push back, both Lee and Hana were eager to jump on the 0% DAO bandwagon as a way to completely screw us over. This makes us VERY suspicious of the BS of “out of scope” /“technical difficulty.” These are just excuses when a solution like 91% vePERP/ 0% DAO / 8.75% v1 Buyback that’s so simple are met with such push back from the team, at the last minute!

[tzt]

@Solace

anything else can be sorted out in subsequent governance discussion

It’s not really fair to the v1 users that they have to go through yet another vote again to just defend their fair share. Option 3 negatively impacted v1 users to double their payout time from 10 years to now 20 years, it’s irresponsible for the team to call it “out of scope” just to sneak in an option that will have big implications for the v1 users. The alternative is simple, technically feasible. Calling it in or out of scope is honestly too arbitrary.

[Solace]

Tbh given the fact that you mentioned Lee and the team helped you with creating the V1 buyback proposal - it’s super unfair to say that.

No one is obligated to ensure you receive compensation. As was mentioned by another user, most users left on V1 towards the end of its lifecycle were taking a huge risk and knowingly had open positions whilst funding rates were highly skewed to one side. For months prior, the platform had several notifications and banners mentioning that the exchange was no longer supported and to use at your own risk. Even 99% of users were still compensated.

And now its now understood that someone was managing money on behalf of other people (which IMO defeats the purpose of decentralized money markets, but whatever), there were real retail people affected in that small 1%. I wouldn’t put that to the discredit to the platform, but to the discredit of whichever entity was still left managing positions on V1 trying to take advantage of lucrative funding rates (hint: if it’s too good to be true, it usually is).

AND YET, despite all of that, Lee still went ahead and thought of a proposal which was EV+ for PERP holders, as well as the pool of affected V1 users that had balances being managed on behalf of someone else (should also mention, whichever entity has the right to claim this compensation can always mishandle these funds for their clients btw).

So yeah, here we are, arguing again whilst getting nowhere to further this proposal.

On that note, would this be acceptable in your opinion?

would you be happy to receive the extra buyback % from option 1 (25% vePERP / 75% DAO) if it meant partaking the downside with option 3 (75% vePERP / 25% DAO)?

[RDL]

@Solace

notifications and banners

We asked Lee about the banner, he said it simply means v1 won’t be updated but users fund are safe. We trusted the team to the last minute. We weren’t in it for the high yield, it’s capped anyway, we were there because we trusted the team’s word that they will keep alive and will pull the trigger and shut down before users fund are impacted. The loss we suffer from op4 is more in line with what the team promised. We’d never imagine they will put up three options in the vote that benefitted Alameda, resulting in a near complete loss of our fund, while everyone else including some who took high leverage positions got full compensation. This is not fair.

We have debated this for too many times, you should really checked our previous proposal. All the points you mentioned we have seen many times already and we’re able to defend.

So stop trying to screw v1 and accept the Buyback vote result already.

@Solace

would you be happy to receive the extra buyback % from option 1 (25% vePERP / 75% DAO) if it meant partaking the downside with option 3 (75% vePERP / 25% DAO)?

No, because it’s clear the team and holders wanted to increase vePERP for this vote. There’s not a single mention of increasing DAO% and we don’t expect the team would have such a kind heart to make faster payout. As long as they don’t screw us over by making it longer, we will be more than happy.

[hanamizuki]

The quorum was added in the tokenomics vote which is before the fee split vote. So it was known that it didn’t pass the quorum.

I care about v1 users because you guys are early adaptors and I’ve been trying to put together solutions. Look at my first comment today, I was going to include all options. Then I learned some of them are not working. I’m not smart enough to realize it earlier. But I was still trying to find solutions like launching another proposal. We can help facilitate new proposals and I really need your collaboration. This proposal is supposed to be about the parameters only.

[LeeKB]

@RDL

As so many people have already expressed their opinions against 0% DAO, why do you still not listen!?

Sir you misunderstand this purpose of this forum. We are collecting feedback with the goal of ensuring as many voices will be represented on the ballot as possible.

[RDL]

@hanamizuki

I really need your collaboration.

I wanted to collaborate, but I find it hard because despite all the arguments I have given in the past week, you guys still try to do everything possible to minimize us. 17.5% of 50% was our bottom line which we put whole hearted effort to lower the burden to Perp as much as we already can.

@Solace

Lee still went ahead and thought of a proposal

We were thankful, but given the latest context, it could very well be just a tool to calm us down temporarily.

I find this discussion has been in a loop that doesn’t go anywhere.

I would advocate for this following given the “technical difficulty”of implementing transferring fund out of DAO

1. 25% vePERP / 75% DAO
2. 50% vePERP / 50% DAO
3. 75% vePERP / 25% DAO, 35% DAO income to v1 Buyback

@hanamizuki you are the proposer, so you do whatever , but you also bear the responsibility of whatever your decision results in