I’m not from the team. Struggling is clear if you look at the current volumes/fees generated figures. Binance cooperation will not fix business model by itself.
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Nor will 1% difference in APR magically fix the problem. It will actually worsen the problem due to the unhappy v1 users. Binance cooperation will at least help the protocol remain operational through the bear market, once bull market returns everyone will be happy.
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Edit: it turns our we are talking about v1 sunset funds distribution, not compensation
I can only assume this is their own money they are transferring. Perp never gave anyone 2.5mm.
For the first address you provide, they bridged 500k to xDai on May 15, then bridged 546k out July 12.
0x0F4ee9631f4be0a63756515141281A3E2B293Bbe (Alameda address, according to Etherscan)
In: Gnosis chain transaction 0x0771c4e5df77380ac20847d1660c03400d4c315c7a661fafcaa795f85354af22 | Blockscout
Out: Gnosis chain transaction 0xcd8c9f70462082305fa548cca31b25cc92f67506aa3a12ad51812279fbcf01b9 | Blockscout
These were funds in Alameda’s gnosis safe - not in Perp v1.
Yes I do, since I have been curious for months where the “2.5mm given to investors” idea came from. Finally I have some understanding 
Solace is a Perpvangelist, which is a community program funded by the Perpetual DAO, not the core team. All payments received by Perpvangelists are coordinated and decided within the Perpvangelist team itself. Any opinion expressed here by community members, which includes Perpvanglists, is entirely their own.
No that’s not true. The 546,724 USDC was the exact amount that the governance voted to distribute the remaining fund under option 2 during the v1 sunset:
Source
The disbursement was performed on Jun 1st to ALL v1 users, here’s the transaction of the disbursement:
Link of the transaction
The amount transferred out of the top 5 wallets on July 12 matched exactly the same amount in the option 2 all at the same time!
So the team distribute the remaining fund from v1 on Jun 1st, they withdrew a month later.
As you can see, in op4 (following vAMM rule), the top 5 addresses (Alameda) would not get anything back because their 2X positions were liquidated! But the team drafted vote options that allows them to gain back 2.5M (2.67M to be exact) outside of the normal vAMM rule. These 2.67M are coming from the low leverage users like us (including our free collateral!). I hope now you can understand better why we are so angry about this whole issue! Of course Perp had some incentive to take care of its investors first! So they put a knife onto their customer instead!? Doing a haircut without any consideration of leverage and free collateral is just so wrong. This has been debated enough times, and that’s why the Buyback proposal was drafted and passed. A reversal of that will be a complete disaster for Perp.
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Perp should really turn a new page by not screwing the v1 users again. The above proposal seem to make DAO happy as well. What do you think @LeeKB @hanamizuki ? We shouldn’t delay the vote any further!
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Ohhh ok, sorry I am so confused. You are talking about the result of this vote.
If you don’t accept the legitimacy of the governance process, then I’m not sure what else to say.
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You should tell that to all the anti-v1 people who cannot accept the result of the Buyback back vote result.
The v1 sunset vote options were drafted without the consideration of basic common sense factors such as leverage and free collateral. That’s why the subsequent governance proposal (v1 Buyback) was proposed to fix this black mark of Perp history, and it was passed. It’s a demonstration of the governance process working.
This time, we don’t want to see Perp make the same mistake of drafting vote options carelessly that could negatively impact the v1 users. After all, this vote is about using the un-utilized fund in DAO to boost vePERP yield. V1 is not the main point of this discussion, we should not drag them into this whole conversation by drafting options that will prolong their payout time from 10 years to 20 years or 55 years or infinity!
The voters will often time vote for whichever option that is most beneficial to them without the consideration of other nuances. So it’s up to the vote proposer to balance and carefully crafted the vote options to ensure all parties are happy. And that’s why we are having this whole conversation here in the governance post: to discuss and find out if there’s any problem with the vote options. We pointed out an obviously problem in the vote options regarding infringing the v1 users, and we have proposed alternative solutions. We defended all of the anti-v1 comments. If the vote proposer (Hana) is honoring the governance process, she should listen to the suggestions and fix the problems in the vote options that were pointed out, and move on to the vote.
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Thank you everyone for providing feedback. The original options may not be perfect but this is a relaunch of the previous vote which didn’t pass the quorum. So I’m grateful to get this many ideas.
So far we can see the following options proposed (let me know if I missed anything):
-
Original
- 50% DAO / 50% vePERP holders
- 75% DAO / 25% vePERP holders
- 25% DAO / 75% vePERP holders
-
Mckenna
- 50% DAO / 50% vePERP holders
- 75% DAO / 25% vePERP holders
- 25% DAO / 75% vePERP holders
- 100% to vePERP
-
RDL
- 25% vePERP / 61.875% DAO / 13.125% Buyback
- 50% vePERP / 41.25% DAO / 8.75% Buyback
- 75% vePERP / 16.25% DAO / 8.75% Buyback
- 91.25% vePERP / 0% DAO / 8.75% Buyback
-
0xstarscourge
- 50% DAO / 50% vePERP holders
- 75% DAO / 25% vePERP holders
- 25% DAO / 75% vePERP holders
- 0% DAO / 100% vePERP holders in the beginning, then change to the 2nd highest option 6 months later
-
Lee
- 25% DAO / 75% vePERP holders (DAO funds used for buyback as planned)
- 91.25% vePERP / 8.75% v1 Buyback (no funds to DAO)
- 100% vePERP for 3 months, then option 2
- 100% vePERP for 6 months, then option 2
-
Matthew0212
- 50% DAO / 50% vePERP holders
- 50% DAO / 50% vePERP holders, then allocate 50% of DAO income to vePERP.
(Effectively 75% vePERP /16.25% DAO /8.75% vBuyback) - 50% DAO / 50% vePERP holders, then allocate 62.5% of DAO income to vePERP.
(Effectively 81.25% vePERP/ 10% DAO /8.75% Buyback ) - 50% DAO/ 50% vePERP holders, then allocate 72.5% of DAO income to vePERP.
(Effectively 86.25% vePERP/ 5% DAO /8.75 % Buyback)
And I spent some time consolidating all the ideas about options and it looks like there are 3 sets of options. Let me know if I misinterpret any of them.
Option set #1
We straight out list every idea, even if some of them are irrelevant or against previous vote results.
- 50% DAO / 50% vePERP holders (original option)
- 75% DAO / 25% vePERP holders (original option)
- 25% DAO / 75% vePERP holders (original option)
- 100% to vePERP (Mckenna’s idea)
- 0% DAO / 100% vePERP holders in the beginning, then change to the 2nd highest option 6 months later (0xstarscourge’s idea)
- 75% vePERP / 16.25% DAO / 8.75% Buyback (RDL & Matthew0212’s idea)
- 91.25% vePERP / 0% DAO / 8.75% Buyback (RDL & Matthew0212’s idea)
- 100% vePERP for 3 months, then 91.25% vePERP / 0% DAO / 8.75% Buyback (Lee’s idea)
- 100% vePERP for 6 months, then 91.25% vePERP / 0% DAO / 8.75% Buyback (Lee & 0xstarscourge’s idea)
Option set #2
Some feedback is that any options that are not 50%/50% should not be considered. The argument is that the v1 buyback plan is based on the consensus of the 50%/50% fee split. Although it is not written clearly in the buyback proposal, on the sheet all the numbers are based on this assumption.
- 50% DAO / 50% vePERP holders
- 50% DAO / 50% vePERP holders, then allocate 50% of DAO income to vePERP.
(Effectively 75% vePERP /16.25% DAO /8.75% vBuyback) - 50% DAO / 50% vePERP holders, then allocate 62.5% of DAO income to vePERP.
(Effectively 81.25% vePERP/ 10% DAO /8.75% Buyback ) - 50% DAO/ 50% vePERP holders, then allocate 72.5% of DAO income to vePERP.
(Effectively 86.25% vePERP/ 5% DAO /8.75 % Buyback)
However, I consulted with dev team and the options here are not easy to implement as it needs manual work to send funds from DAO to vePERP and it’s not really scalable. If we want to move in this direction, we need to dig deeper into the implementation part.
Option set #3
Another group of feedback is that all options about v1 buyback should not be considered in this particular proposal. The argument is that they are irrelevant and the assumption of 50%/50% is not correct. If anyone wants to overturn the buyback plan they should start another proposal.
- 50% DAO / 50% vePERP holders (original option)
- 75% DAO / 25% vePERP holders (original option)
- 25% DAO / 75% vePERP holders (original option)
- 100% to vePERP (Mckenna’s idea)
- 0% DAO / 100% vePERP holders in the beginning, then change to the 2nd highest option 6 months later (0xstarscourge’s idea)
Option set #4 (updated)
Based on @abdulla’s opinion we should stick to the original options.
- 50% DAO / 50% vePERP holders (original option)
- 75% DAO / 25% vePERP holders (original option)
- 25% DAO / 75% vePERP holders (original option)
I want to finalize the options so we can launch the vote as soon as possible so the “real yield” story can be spread and Perp can take off. Can I get everyone’s collaboration on discussing with respect and only discuss what options we want to include?
I appreciate everyone’s effort in making Perp better. Thank you!
As people have spent the whole past week debating, option set #2 is the most appropriate.
This sounds to me like an excuse to be honest. Worst case, we can just go directly to the final split ratios, but knowing that’s the results from a two-step process, we can simplify the execution to one step to save gas cost.
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To be clear, Abdulla is advocating for initial options with the appropriate % allocated to buyback. He’s actually advocating for the v1 users.
So that’d be something like:
- 8.75% v1 Buyback, 50/50 split for DAO /vePERP
- 8.75% v1 Buyback, 75/25 split for DAO /vePERP
- 8.75% v1 Buyback, 25/75 split for DAO/vePERP
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Hi all,
I talked to our dev team and learned more about the implementation details, and I feel some of the discussions here are out of scope.
The temp check that’s passed is about the “Parameters” of fee split between “DAO/vePERP”.
So some of the proposed new options are not valid here.
For example,
@RDL’s idea:
75% vePERP / 16.25% DAO / 8.75% Buyback
The “8.75% Buyback” is NOT the parameter we are voting on and it’s out of scope.
@Matthew0212’s idea:
50% DAO/ 50% vePERP holders, then allocate 72.5% of DAO income to vePERP
The 50%/50% is what we are voting on, but then we need to allocate 72.5% of DAO to vePERP.
This proposal does not include how we use DAO treasury. It needs another proposal.
@LeeKB’s idea:
100% vePERP for 3 months, then 91.25% vePERP / 0% DAO / 8.75% Buyback
The 100% is the parameter we are voting on, but the timeframe is not, because ppl might have different opinions about how long they want this to last.
@0xstarscourge’s idea:
0% DAO / 100% vePERP holders in the beginning, then change to the 2nd highest option 6 months later
Same as above.
We are discussing only two parameters here: “DAO” and “vePERP”.
Since the tokenomics v2 proposal passed, we have been working on the development and the “DAO/vePERP” parameters have been coded and audited (example github pr). So all options with new parameters will need code rewriting and auditing. And it’s not in the scope of this proposal.
In other words, we are discussing two and ONLY TWO parameters here: % to DAO / % to vePERP.
As the original proposer, I would need to keep all options feasible and align with the original ask. I would propose the following final options.
Vote #1
- 50% DAO / 50% vePERP holders (original option)
- 75% DAO / 25% vePERP holders (original option)
- 25% DAO / 75% vePERP holders (original option)
- 0% DAO / 100% vePERP holders (Mckenna’s idea)
(only these options apply to the scope of this proposal)
Vote #2
If the result of vote #1 result is 100%, launch the second proposal to decide the period.
- 3 months
- 6 months
If the result of vote #1 result is 50%/50%, launch the second proposal to decide how we want to send DAO income to vePERP users.
- 50%
- 62.5%
- 72.5%
Thanks again for everyone’s feedback. Today is the last day of the discussion period, let’s wrap it up and work together for a solution.
Hi @rundontwalk thanks for bringing this up. Not sure if @abdulla can help clarify but my understanding is to stick to the original options, and because the buyback plan that passed the vote is to take the fee income from DAO so v1 users should get some from the DAO here. We don’t need to state it in the option. Correct me if I’m wrong @abdulla.
As so many people have already expressed their opinions against 0% DAO, why do you still not listen!? Option 4 should be off the table because it directly contradicts the Buyback plan…
Option 3 also doesn’t make sense because if vePERP wants higher yield, it actually makes sense for them to go with Option 2 first, then any of the follow up options in vote#2 will result in higher if not equal yield for them. So I suggest remove option 3 as it doesn’t do anything for vePERP holders.
I suggest:
Vote #1
- 50% DAO / 50% vePERP holders (original option)
- 75% DAO / 25% vePERP holders (original option)
- Abstain
Vote #2
If the result of vote #1 result is 50%/50%, launch the second proposal to decide how we want to send DAO income to vePERP users.
- 50%
- 62.5%
- 72.5%
4 Likes
As vePERP holders, ideally we would want to go directly on vote #2, but I guess due to the limitation the team has mentioned, we have to wait. I hope it won’t take too much longer.
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The option set 1 look messy and not prepared. The option set 2 is based on a false assumption and looks like it’s not feasible. But the option set 3 & 4 deliberately ignore v1 users which looks really bad.
As a PERP holder (who bought at $20 and hodl until now) I would prefer more fee goes to vePERP but at the same time not hurting v1 users, so if I had to choose maybe the messy option set 1 makes most sense so I can vote for the 91.25% option.
but if it’s out of scope,
maybe we should revisit the goals:
- to get the real yield narrative and boost growth (PERP prize)
- make sure v1 users are happy
If we want to achieve both maybe we do need another proposal.
2 Likes
Maybe we can add 82.5% as the 4th option in vote #2, that will translate to 91.25% I think. But that will make the DAO people upset, so if no DAO objection, we can add 82.5% in vote #2?
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Jackm, thank you for your support to the v1 users. I believe if Perp maintains a good reputation, it will one day reach back to the $20 and beyond for sure. With the collapse of Celsius, 3AC and the latest FTX, the credibility of the crypto world was great shaken. This is the time more important than ever to ensure a crypto project is trust worthy.
Having a v1 incident can actually be a blessing rather than a curse, it depends on how the Perp community decide to treat them. If they worked together with v1 users to try to compensate them, the message can be a positive that even in the worst case scenario, Perp will care it’s users first! This would a tremendously powerful message. While other exchanges can make empty promises all they want, Perp actually had a real case and real action taken to prove they care about their users first. This core value will be the foundation of Perp’s future success.
3 Likes
Let me reply one by one here.
Hi @RDL, thanks for pointing this out. I was only thinking about if the new options are the TWO parameters so I kept the 100% option. The buyback plan does mention “DAO treasury fee income”, so if we add an option for DAO to have 0 fee income, it might sound inconsiderate. But I still think it’s a bit subjective as people do think about adding a time factor. So if the community still wants the option I’d keep it. But if no one says anything, I would remove it.
As for option 3, you are right, if holders prefer a higher yield they should go with it. But it makes sense to keep it and let voters decide.
I’m not sure how long it takes to implement but the dev team will only start working on it when it passes. But I think we anyone can launch the proposal right after this one ends.
Afaik if we want to send DAO treasury fee income to vePERP it’s technically infeasible for the current contract. Unless we rewrite everything, the team will need to manually calculate and send the tokens from DAO to vePERP holders every week, which is not very scalable. But I think we can discuss more details if there is the proposal.
It’s the last day of the discussion period, if there are no more arguments I’ll go ahead and launch the vote with these options 2022-12-07T03:00:00Z. Thanks!
- 50% DAO / 50% vePERP holders
- 75% DAO / 25% vePERP holders
- 25% DAO / 75% vePERP holders
0% DAO / 100% vePERP holders (Mckenna’s idea)if no one opposes it, I’d remove this
Thanks again for participating in this discussion.
No, if vePERP holders want higher yield, they would want to vote for the 50-50 option which then lead to vote #2 that allows them to earn higher yield up to 86.25% or even 91.25% (if we include that option in vote#2) of overflown fee.
Additionally, option 3 prolonged the v1 payout by another decade! Despite all the comments you hear from the community about not negatively impacting v1 users, why are you still so persistent in including that option?
That option clearly did not benefit vePERP nor v1 users. If anything it only serves to minimize the v1 payout. This is really bad for Perp.
We strongly oppose it.
Listen to your most loyal investor:
Option 3 would not make v1 happy.
1 Like