No need to vote, this rule is already in the white paper
1 Like
No need for minting, just take out the token from the perp staking pool.
perp staking pools are bear risky
The litepaper and whitepaper describe the ideas behind the project, not the final implementation. For example, âthe Insurance Fund, which receives 50% of the trading feesâ was part of the plan, but not part of the final implementation. Our procedure for any decision about how PERP are used has always been to receive a clear mandate from the community before acting.
Following discord thread and Bugfix explanations (thanks you!), I now think that -4 is the more fair for everyone, as it is based on position size and not on collateral. Iâm against differentiating users based on their positions size or leverage. Every trader using the protocol as intended should be considered the same.
I also think that Perp should try to compensate for the remaining losses (with a debt token , vested Perp, etc)
Good luck to the team and to every perpv1 traders impacted, I hope we will find a solution!
5 Likes
There were 5 wallets associated with Alameda. Theyâre responsible for most of OI/margin placed.
Take out whales like them from compensation and everyone else will be all right.
4 Likes
There must be an option that closes positions, repays the collateral without paying positive pnl (so that collateralized accounts with negative pnl get their collateral back) then begins to pay out profits.
Any other option is stealing from users that still have collateral after liquidating their negative position to pay positive PNL users who were already made whole with their collateral.
I propose:
1a) Positive PNL closed and only cost basis repaid & 1b) Negative PNL closed and any remaining collateral from that position repaid.
Then 2) positive PNLs paid with remaining funds.
If any method but this one is used, it is robbing negative PNLs (who have remaining collateral) to more than make whole positive PNLs. For negative PNLs, they should not be penalized for continuing to add collateral to prevent liquidation. Any other method would be stealing funds from these users
4 Likes
I mentioned that option above citing thatâs how centralized exchanges managed socialized loss. Notice, however, that, on Perp the imbalance between longs and shorts makes that unrealized positive PNL sum not even $0.2M, so the remainder loss would still propagate to the losing positions, and need to be dealt with something like options 1-4
1 Like
The opponentâs position belongs to the team, so he is responsible for asking us to exit safely. Except for the Alameda whale. Itâs like a scam exchange if we canât exit normally.
3 Likes
0x0f4ee9631f4be0a63756515141281a3e2b293bbe
0x975d2dd35726e1f4e6af7e22880c49ffeda67339
0x88301e10b0ee2f7eb2c9dc9c8b98b813946d144e
0x3013ea1baafe595d6c54419a0d7e420de524c52b
0x5dac431f0479a1413c8734634c7d9de577675d40
Here is the list of Alamedaâs wallets. Only ETH margin on this wallets exceeds USD 10mln. Also itâs them whoâs been liquidated on CREAM. IMO it would be correct to add the option of not compensating whales like them who didnât bring any value to the protocol, just risks. They didnât do any active trading, didnât generate a lot fees therefore, just reaped funding (keeping neutral positions most likely).
This option would help keeping average Joe compensated in full. Please like.
5 Likes
We should call Alameda to lose money because his liquidation caused the InsuranceFund to subsidize him 2,506,129.609 USDC.
If paying from its other positive pnl should be enough. It is conceivable that we use the full margin to help him calculate the money.
1 Like
Alameda took its risk, they opened large positions and no way they were able to close them without loss. We shouldnât compensate them.
4 Likes
Alameda 0x3013
Because the liquidation needs to pay 5,000,000, but our InsuranceFund helped him pay 2,500,000.
I believe justice will be late but never absent
3 Likes
From discord:
How does everyone feel about this idea:
Everyone gets their full position in newly minted PERP, and that PERP is locked+staked for 1 year. All of the remaining USDC funds are paid over 2 years as weekly staking rewards to all staked PERP.
To be clear you get 0 of your USDC back. You only get staked/locked PERP.
Existing PERP holders are happy because they get a yield increase, it incentivizes new buyers of PERP because of the increased staking yield. When PERP 1 year unlocks, the yield increase continues for another year so many will stay staked. If PERP price holds then everyone gets their funds back.
PERP price may initially increase because of this.At least this way there is a chance that everyone is repaid, and PERP doesnât suffer reputation damage.
2 Likes
Relative to 1-4, I think is a good option
1 Like
This could be combined with one of the âRobin Hoodâ proposals (options 2/3, 3 is better IMO), considering that 90% of the claim value (margin + uPNL) concentrates in the top 5% of accounts.
We could thus, e.g., use 10% of the USDC to immediately make whole the bottom 95% of the userbase. The remaining top 5% would instead get compensated with PERP in the two-year-lock staking pool, which gets fed with the other 90% of USDC.
This assumes that all HNWI are treated equally. Itâs a separate question whether the very âwhaleâ that overstrained the system past its point of rupture (Alameda or whoever they are) should get the same PERP compensation or not.
1 Like
When can we get the official spread sheets of various scenarios? I believe even the top 5% should have the choice of whether they want to take the loss or participate in more risk. Letâs say if we still get 60% of the Margin-PNL from option 1~4, then weâre essentially taking a huge risk in participating and risk losing everything if Perp couldnât hold the price. It really depends on how much we can get back through option 1~4 before putting such risky proposition to the vote.
3 Likes
Proposal:
- Weâre doing calculation for each wallet : Value = margin + Upnl at oracle price at shutdown moment Upnl could be negative. Upnl = size*(oracle_price at shutdown - entry_price)
- Sort every wallet by Value
- compensate in full starting from wallet with smallest Value and going up until we run out of compensation fund (5.5 mln)
I pretty much sure, as per my calculation retail even significant ones will be covered. Alameda unfortunately not.
3 Likes
Canât we use for example last index price to calculate every trader equity at shutdown time, then we know the bad debt, and we can take into account OI to give a fair share of debt to every trader?
That way, no matter your size, pnl or leverage, everyone take their share of the losses?
If one has 10% of the OI, heâll have 10% of the final haircut?
2 Likes
Proposal
Option 6:
Perp team refund 100% of the funds at closing exchange prices from the perp1 funds, perp2 funds, and teamâs PERP token reserves.
w\wo locks but it should be whole 100%
The reputation and reliability of all of the teamâs products is at stake, so all means must be employed without any compromise.
5 Likes
I support a Robin Hood option better, but if weâre going for a proportional option, then yes make the haircut proportional to OI seems much fairer than making it proportional to the netted margin
3 Likes