Let me summarize the context: Title and description of this vote refer to last month’s vote about Sunsetting Perp V1.
Perp v1 went tits up last month leaving behind a big hole. The protocol was stopped, but only after it was left in deep insolvency. A sunsetting plan was drafted asking the community what to do with the remaining funds (USDC). The resulting vote is this one here: Snapshot
As it’s noticed, Proposal 2 (op2, in the gov thread) won and the corresponding disbursement of funds was executed. An alternative Proposal 4 (op4) managed to get an important share of votes, however. The main virtues of that op4 is that it’d have simulated the vAMM mechanism, in a way that it benefited positions with lower leverage.
Here on this forum and on discord, some of the voters explained their rationale for having preferred op2 over op4. Without generalizing (every voter had their own reasons) it was commonly evoked that op2 benefited more the small players.
However, op2 as compared to op4 harmed the most a small group formed of the bigger plebs in the $100k-$1M range, but not the top >$1M positions. This is because they got the same degree of haircut as the bigger whale positions (op2), even though they could have exited their positions while still staying above water (op4). This is the justification for requesting op4-op2 amounts in the form of vested PERP.
Now, my opinion: I think that the reputation of the Perp protocol is at stake here. Even though it’s now v2 what supports PERP value, how we treat this case affects what we’ll anticipate for potential v2 hiccups. As a PERP holder, Proposal C is a clear net negative because of how it damages perception. Proposal B (or A, even) have the downside of spending a not insignificant part of the DAO treasury, but for a worthy cause which I think makes PERP more valuable. The vesting ensures no short term price impact, and the continued commitment of those power users.
On Proposal B vs. Proposal A: I support either and I’ll go with the one that gets the vote lead. The former is cheaper, but on the same order of magnitude. The latter could be seen as more fair, as it does the same treatment to everyone, independently of whether they have requested compensation or not. OTOH, those who don’t see this initiative as fair, but who care about PERP reputation and who worry about leaving angry creditors, may want to compensate those that expressly requested it and chose Proposal B.